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The continuing successes of populist parties across Europe direct us to comprehensively 
examine the circumstances contributing to their growth. In this context, the question is often 
asked whether and to what extent the mass media provide a stage for populist messages 
and actors. The aim of this article is to discuss the relationship between party populism and 
media access and to analyze whether the use of populist communication is a successful 
strategy for disproportionate media attention. Through an input-output analysis, the article 
provides information about the specific proportions of populist party input that made it into 
news coverage. A quantitative content analysis of press releases and political news coverage 
in four EU countries shows that only in certain countries do political actors receive 
overproportionate visibility because of their populist communication. Moreover, all 
newspapers have a corrective effect on the dissemination of populist party statements. Thus, 
despite the news value inherent in populist communication, the mass media do not play an 
unreservedly conducive role in the promotion of populism. 
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In recent years, populist movements have experienced a rapid rise, especially in Europe. Because 
populists not only question the model of liberal democracy, but also have considerable potential for political 
polarization (Priester, 2012), it is all the more important to comprehensively examine the circumstances that 
contribute to their growth. There is now a broad consensus in the academic community that populism research 
should focus not only on political actors, but also on communication-oriented approaches, particularly regarding 
the mass media (Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Mazzoleni, Stewart, & Horsfield, 
2003; Mudde, 2004). As essential links between the political elites and the people, the mass media provide 
the public with information while influencing the conditions of party competition by providing or denying media 
access to political actors. Covering populist party communication in the news may entail concrete support for 
populist parties because this coverage provides them with a national stage from which they can spread populist 
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stances and be given party recognition and legitimacy (Ellinas, 2010; Mazzoleni, 2003). Against this backdrop, 
it is presumed that the media offer a particularly receptive environment for covering populist actors and 
messages because of a close link between populism and news value (Mazzoleni, 2003). 
 
Research on the mass media’s actual role in the conveyance of populism and strengthening of populist 
actors is burgeoning, and recently, some valuable international comparative studies have been conducted in 
this field (e.g., Ernst, Esser, Blassnig, & Engesser, 2019; Wettstein et al., 2019). So far, however, even studies 
that deal comparatively with the appearance of populism or populist parties in the media provide little 
information about the specific proportions of populist party communication that have made it into news 
coverage. If a study focuses only on populist actors’ or messages’ saliency in the media without including the 
preceding party communication in the analysis, it remains unclear whether and to what extent the media 
visibility of populist messages or parties is related to the media’s expressed share of a party’s populist 
communication. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn regarding how successful the parties have been in getting 
into the media through their populism (and whether their populist messages are overrepresented in the media 
compared with what they have been sending out). It is also not possible to adequately grasp which factors 
may have induced the media to depict this party populism. 
 
To close this research gap, the current article centers on the following research questions: 
 
RQ1: How is the use of populist party communication related to a party’s access to the media? 
 
RQ2: Is a party’s use of populist communication a successful strategy for disproportionate media attention 
during election campaigns? 
 
I explore these questions by conducting an extensive quantitative content analysis of party press 
releases and political news coverage in the print media in four European countries 12 weeks before the 2014 
European Parliament (EP) elections. The present article’s contribution is twofold. First, it provides insights into 
the specific processing of populist input into news coverage and, in this context, discusses the news value of 
populist communication. The use of an input-output analysis—an approach that is largely lacking in previous 
studies—enables a direct comparison of the populist communication sent out by parties with the proportion of 
party populism ultimately depicted in the news. Second, on a descriptive level, the study design also allows 
for a cross-country comparative analysis of the mass media’s actual handling of populist communication during 
the 2014 EP election campaign. The aim of the current article is to study populism at the intersection between 
the political and media systems and to shed light on the extent to which the news value of populist 
communication influences the journalistic processing of party communication. By directly juxtaposing parties’ 
press releases with political news articles, it is possible to gain insights into the ways in which political and 
media actors interact and to examine the transfer of populist communication from one operational framework 
to another. 
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Defining Populist Communication 
 
One of the most common definitions states populism is 
 
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. 
(Mudde, 2004, p. 543) 
 
In this logic, a monolithic people—which is inherently decent, ordinary, and of common sense (e.g., 
Taggart, 2000)—stands opposed to the elites, who do not feature these virtues and have deceived the 
people of their rightful sovereignty. 
 
Populist ideology is usually reflected in the specific discursive patterns of (political) actors, making 
it empirically visible and measurable (de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann, & Stanyer, 2018). Jagers and 
Walgrave (2007) were among the first to empirically quantify populist communication through classical 
content analysis, thereby influencing a number of subsequent studies (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017; 
Vasilopoulou, Halikiopoulou, & Exadaktylos, 2014). They perceive populism as a political communication 
style composed of particular rhetorical elements. The following definition is partly based on this conception 
and understands populist communication as a verbal statement consisting of an appeal to the people and 
criticism of the establishment. In this sense, populism is the property of a message, not the property of the 
communicating actor (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2014). Accordingly, a political actor cannot be 
described as being populist or not; rather, one actor may be classified as being more or less populist than 
another based on how many populist messages he or she has delivered. 
 
The first element—a people reference—lies at the heart of the concept and necessarily must occur 
as a precondition to qualify a verbal statement as being populist. As a guiding principle, populism appeals 
to and identifies with “the people” and justifies its actions in doing so. However, because displaying closeness 
to the people is part of the normal political discourse, an appeal to the people is—contrary to the original 
conception—not sufficient alone in defining a populist statement. To be in line with the definition of Mudde 
(2007), a people reference must always appear together with an elite critique.2 Through the imperative 
conjunction of both rhetorical elements within a statement, it also becomes clear that sole “anti-elitism” 
without an appeal to the people is, likewise, not considered to be populist communication. Populism is thus 
 
2 While this definition takes adequate account of academic discourse’s minimal consensus on a people–elite 
antagonism being inherent in populism (e.g., Mudde, 2007; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Taggart, 2000), the demand 
for the people’s sovereignty is not explicitly included in this analysis. It can, however, be assumed that this 
implicitly resonates in exaggerating the people while simultaneously devaluing the ruling elites. Moreover, a 
separate operationalization of the concept is not conducted for reasons of feasibility within the framework of 
the content analysis: Explicit references to the sovereignty of the people are hardly found in press releases 
(the channel through which party communication is investigated), because political actors predominantly use 
them to discuss daily topics and specific contents rather than questioning the system as a whole. 
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first and foremost a relational concept in which the people have an antagonistic relationship to an imminent 
opponent (Priester, 2012). 
 
Populism and the Media 
 
When investigating how the mass media deal with populist communication, one must distinguish 
between populism emanating from political parties and entering the media (populism through the media) 
and populism by the media, which emanates from media professionals themselves (e.g., Esser, Stępińska, 
& Hopmann, 2017). Whereas the first variant reflects party populism conveyed by the media, the second 
form can be described as genuine media populism. In accordance with the research question presented 
earlier, the current article investigates whether, why, and to what extent the populist input of parties reaches 
the media without addressing the second perspective in more detail. 
 
The Mass Media’s Handling of Party Populism 
 
Acting as gatekeepers, journalists decide whether to cover incoming party communication in 
their political news section, thereby allocating more or less media attention to a party or its messages. 
For a political message, visibility in the media is a necessary prerequisite to influencing public discourse 
and being further disseminated into the public (Koopmans & Muis, 2009). Populist messages in particular 
are said to be highly persuasive and decisively influence a party’s public perception (Bos, van der Brug, 
& de Vreese, 2013; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2016). Accordingly, the more populism makes it into 
the news, the more clearly a populist party sharpens its profile, and the more effectively voters may be 
won over. However, political actors usually maintain a continuous dialog with the public, and not all 
content can be presented in a populist manner. Therefore, it is particularly advantageous for the 
respective parties if, in relation to the total messages sent out, it is first and foremost their populist 
messages that are conveyed by the media. If populist messages are hence overrepresented in reporting, 
the media essentially act as amplifiers of party populism. 
 
Once the media report on the ideological arguments of populist communicators, the media also 
increase the public visibility and legitimacy of the parties (Esser et al., 2017). Moreover, frequent media 
presence on its own—even if the actual message is not (or only in a heavily modified form) transmitted 
to the media—may raise a party’s recognition, signal political viability, and create the impression of 
significance in the political process (Ellinas, 2010).3 This indirect reaction of the media to populist 
communication is especially advantageous for the parties if they receive more media attention than less 
populist or nonpopulist parties. Usually, the extent to which national political actors become visible and 
have a voice in the media is influenced by a party’s political relevance. However, if parties become 
overproportionally visible in the news because of their populism, then the media take on a role as the 
populists’ secret helpers. 
 
3 In this context, it seems to be rather unimportant whether the media report positively or negatively on 
the populist communicator. According to Mudde (2007), populists probably benefit from any kind of visibility 
because the potential voter segment they target tends to be more critical of the established media and 
hence is less influenced by their evaluations. 
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The News Value of Populist Communication 
 
The news value theory is one of several approaches that explain how journalists proceed when 
deciding what to cover. Accordingly, news stories about events and topics can feature specific “news factors” 
that contribute to making these stories newsworthy (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). 
Journalists base their selection on these news factors to which they assign a certain news value. A message 
with a high news value eventually has a higher chance of getting covered by the media. 
 
As shown in Table 1, both elements of populist communication can be associated with specific news 
factors elaborated by Schulz (1976) and Staab (1990).4 According to news value research, events that are 
familiar from one’s own cultural perspective or from culturally close societies are more likely to be covered 
because they attract the audience’s attention (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). Thus, because a populist people 
reference directly appeals to the community that one identifies with (i.e., to a specific in-group), it carries the 
news factors cultural proximity and ethnocentrism, which express to what extent an event refers to its own in-
group (Schulz, 1976). 
 
Contents in connection with elites also attract the attention of the audience and are easier to get into 
the news because, first, they are seen as having more consequences for the recipients than others, and second, 
elite people often represent objects of identification for ordinary citizens (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Schulz, 1976). 
First and foremost, a populist elite critique thus carries the news factor personal influence because by definition, 
it always establishes an elite reference—that is, a reference to persons (or institutions) with power, influence, 
or prestige. 
 
Furthermore, negative news has a higher chance of getting into the news: This type of news is 
unambiguous, satisfies a widespread psychological need for negative events, and develops more quickly than 
positive events, thus fitting better into the media’s short publication cycle (Galtung & Ruge, 1965). A populist 
establishment critique contains several aspects of negativity: The verbal hostilities of populists as an expression 
of their disagreement with the ruling elites carry news factors such as conflict, which includes political events 
of an aggressive nature (Schulz, 1976), and controversy, which expresses the contrast between opposing 
viewpoints (Staab, 1990). Populists usually blame the establishment for working against the will of the people 
and for damaging the country and its citizens in doing so. Within their accusations, populists not only refer to 
actual damage, but also predict or expect potential damage (Staab, 1990) that is due to the elites’ failures. 
Finally, an establishment critique sometimes comes with allegations of fraud or other criminal activities—for 
example, when populists accuse the elites of being illegitimately in power or corrupt. Accusations like this carry 
 
4 Sometimes, populist communication is understood not on a content level, but rather as a specific style of 
presentation, such as the use of provocations, vulgar language, dramatization, and simplification (e.g., Bos 
et al., 2013). These stylistic elements too correspond with what is considered newsworthy. However, 
although they may reflect the people–foe antagonism that is essential for populism, their use may also occur 
because some speakers simply seek to make their content more accessible or compelling (Wirth et al., 
2016). Therefore, this definition is not selective enough because too many actually nonpopulist stances may 
be included in the analysis. 
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the news factor crime, which is also an aspect of negativity (Schulz, 1976). All the “negativity” news factors 
describe events that are perceived of as important because of their drama, emotionality, or excitement. 
 
Table 1. News Factors in Populist Communication. 
Element of populism News factors Dimension 
People reference Cultural proximity Proximity 
 Ethnocentrism Identification 
Elite critique Personal influence Status 
 Conflict/controversy Valence (Negativity) 
 Potential/actual damage  
 Crime  
Note. See Schulz, 1976; Staab, 1990. 
 
The main advantage of populist messages over neutral messages is that, in the aggregate, they 
always carry a certain number of news factors and thus a general newsworthiness, independent of their 
specific content. As journalists are guided by the news value of a story, populist messages have a better 
chance of being selected for coverage. I therefore expect that: 
 
H1: Populist party messages are more frequently covered in the news than nonpopulist party 
communication. 
 
Provided that populist communication has an advantage in the journalistic selection process, the 
respective populist message usually appears in a news article in conjunction with the emitting party. 
Consequently, parties that communicate in a populist manner also receive more media attention (i.e., 
visibility) because of their specific communication style. I therefore assume that: 
 
H2: Political parties are more visible in the news if they use populist communication. 
 
In a nutshell, H1 focuses on disproportionate news coverage of populist statements made by political 
parties in their press releases (without any ex-ante classification of populist actors), whereas H2 focuses on 
the disproportionate visibility of parties in the news, contingent on their use of populism in press releases. 
 
Data and Method 
 
Sample 
 
To test these assumptions, party communication and political news coverage are analyzed in four 
European countries: Germany, Austria, France, and Greece. Regarding the independent variable, this case 
selection ensures that party populism is present in all countries in the form of strong populist parties. Because 
the hypotheses postulate cross-national mechanisms whose generalizability increases when confirmed in 
different contexts, case selection follows the logic of a “most different systems” design. Thus, there is variability 
regarding the populist parties’ effective positions of power and the prevailing media system in the selected 
countries: In Austria and Greece, populist parties have been part of the government in the past few years, 
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whereas they have been kept out of the government in France and Germany by the mainstream parties, which 
have categorically rejected coalitions with these respective actors. Furthermore, Germany and Austria are 
countries with democratic-corporatist media systems, whereas France and Greece have polarized-pluralistic 
media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). 
 
Party communication and media coverage were sampled over a period of 12 weeks before the 2014 
EP elections. The European election period is particularly suitable for the current study because EP campaigns 
provide a setting that takes place simultaneously in several European countries, thereby ensuring cross-country 
comparability. To analyze party communication, press releases were collected from all political parties that 
received a vote share of more than 3% in the previous national or European elections (2009) and that published 
at least five press releases during the study period. To limit the data material, only press releases referring to 
content relevant to the European election campaign at least twice (i.e., to the terms EU or Europ*/europ* and/or 
acronyms of EU actors, institutions, or policies) were analyzed. These selection criteria provided a full survey (N 
= 1,931) of press releases on EU issues from a total of 27 political parties (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
To analyze media coverage, two quality newspapers per country were collected: one left-leaning and 
one right-leaning. Because the presented definition of populist communication is rather restrictive, a focus on 
print media is the most promising approach to analyze party populism; it increases the chance of finding populist 
statements, given that political coverage in print media is considerably more extensive than TV or radio reporting 
because of lower production costs and space restrictions (de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 
2006). Regarding the relationship between populism and the media, however, the tabloid press is said to be 
closer to populism than quality media (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2003). Because of its strong orientation toward a mass 
audience, tabloids are more strongly guided by commercial aspects and focus heavily on news factors such as 
conflict, crime, or damage (Mazzoleni, 2003). Beyond this, the tabloid press is also said to exhibit a general anti-
elite bias (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). However, because there are now a number of empirical findings against this 
widespread thesis (e.g., Akkerman, 2011; Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 2010; Rooduijn, 2014) and because 
the political discourse surrounding the European elections mainly takes place in the quality press (Brüggemann, 
Hepp, Kleinen-von Königslöw, & Wessler, 2009), tabloid newspapers are not included in this analysis. Still, it 
can be argued that quality media are primarily read by a small group of well-educated and politically interested 
elites. Yet the way in which the national quality press prepares its political coverage has a considerable impact 
on the broader political discourse because this form of media is usually perceived of as newspapers of record 
that serve as a reference for other media (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006). Last, unedited online media 
content—for example, social media or blog posts—is not suitable for this analysis because the central focus of 
the current study is the journalists’ processing of populist party communication (i.e., their gatekeeping behavior 
and orientation toward news values). All newspapers were collected by subscribing to their corresponding e-
papers, which were downloaded on a daily basis. This made it possible to electronically search the articles; like 
the press releases, only news articles containing at least two EU-relevant terms were included in the analysis. 
To limit the coding material, each country’s left- and right-leaning newspapers were rotated on a daily basis. 
Only political news articles from the front page and political section were coded. Thus, a total of N = 1,349 
articles were used in the quantitative content analysis (see Table A2 in the Appendix). 
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Content Analysis 
 
The selected press releases and news articles represent the present study’s units of analysis; here, 
first, the active actors were identified. An actor was considered active if he or she appeared beyond mere 
mention—for example, in the form of (quoted or direct) statements—and put forward a political opinion therein. 
Only one active actor was coded per press release, namely the (representative of a respective) party or 
parliamentary group that published the release. In news coverage, up to three active actors per article were 
identified. In addition to national political actors, nonnational, supranational, or nonpolitical active actors could 
be identified. They were coded in a separate category, also including heads of state or political actors who 
spoke on behalf of the government rather than their party. This coding logic considered that different actors, 
especially government representatives, competed with national parties and party exponents for visibility in 
political coverage. To capture populist party messages, (only) the statements of national political actors were 
further coded at a content level. In the case of press releases, the entire release was considered an actor’s 
statement; in news coverage, one actor’s statement consisted of all propositions that could be assigned to the 
same actor within one article, whereby they did not have to be contiguous or in direct speech. 
 
To measure populist communication through a content analysis, the variables people reference and 
elite critique were constructed, based on the operationalization by Jagers and Walgrave (2007).5 First, it was 
determined whether an explicit appeal to the people was in an active actor’s statement. To qualify, a statement 
had to meet two criteria. First, the people reference had to be explicit in that the speaker had to refer to the 
population or a specific population group using terms such as nation, people, electorate, taxpayer, and so 
forth. Second, through the statement, the active actor had to advocate for the in-group in question—for 
example, by explicitly taking sides for the community, supporting its concerns and demands, or speaking 
directly in its name, thereby representing the position of “the people” (also see Cranmer, 2011). Because an 
appeal to the people was a necessary condition for populist communication, only if a people reference was 
present was the actor statement further coded. 
 
An elite critique included any statements that contained criticism of political elites, a specific political 
measure, a political line, or the (political) system as a whole, and/or accusations of state failure. In addition, 
criticism directed against economic or cultural elites, such as central banks, intellectuals, or the media, was 
taken into account. An elite critique was understood as a negative evaluation of the establishment, which could 
be expressed through the attribution of negative qualities (e.g., in the form of discreditation or accusations) 
or through an explicit denial of positive qualities (e.g., in the form of an explicit refusal of praise or approval). 
 
The documents were coded by a total of 19 native-speaking coders. Coder training was conducted in 
English; thus, excellent language skills in both the coding language and English were required. Before the 
coders started the actual field work, they had to pass a reliability test and achieve acceptable values for all 
variables. Up to four researcher-coder reliability tests were carried out until all coders reached satisfactory 
reliability values. The coders processed between 10 and 16 articles each, all of which had at least 25 active 
actors (or 25 press releases with the corresponding number of active actors). The final reliability coefficients 
for all the formal variables ranged between a Krippendorff’s α of 0.81 and 1.00; for the identification of active 
 
5 A selection of corresponding coding examples can be found in the Appendix (Table A3). 
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actors, an average value of 0.74 was achieved for the media and a value of 0.86 for the press releases. The 
final reliability values of the two content variables were satisfactory for all variables, and there were no 
systematic differences regarding the document type or the individual coding languages (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Researcher-Coder Reliability (Krippendorff’s α). 
 People reference Elite critique 
Type   
Newspapers 0.70 0.65 
Press releases 0.90 0.75 
Language   
German 0.78 0.69 
Greek 0.80 0.70 
French 0.83 0.72 
Note. N = 25 active actors. 
 
Analytical Strategy 
 
To assess the populist party input, a scale for party populism was made to measure the percentage 
of populism found in a party’s total number of press releases published during the period under study. By 
using these percentages, it was possible to control for the fact that the absolute number of issued press 
releases varied considerably between countries and individual parties. To encompass the mass media’s 
coverage of populist messages, the focus was on the national parties’ actor statements. According to coding 
logic, a party may have placed up to three statements within one article. The percentage of a specific party’s 
populist messages in the news related to that party’s total number of messages coded in news coverage 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix). If a particular party’s percentage of populist statements presented in the 
news corresponded to that party’s percentage of populist press releases, I spoke of a proportional 
representation of populist party messages in the media. 
 
A party was defined as visible in a news article if it was coded as an active actor at least once in 
the respective article. A party’s visibility in the news was measured by the percentage of articles in which 
that party was visible in relation to the total number of news articles published by that newspaper (during 
the period under study). It was considered to be proportional if a party’s visibility in the news corresponded 
to the political relevance of the party, for which I took the percentage of votes for a party in the most recent 
national elections as a proxy. In this way, it was possible to control for the fact that successful parties 
already received a lot of media attention. 
 
Two approaches were made to verify the assumptions. I first analyzed newspaper- and party-
specific frequency distributions of populist messages and parties visible in political news coverage while 
contrasting them with the populist party input. Thus, it was also possible to identify the national 
characteristics of the media’s handling of populist party communication and deal with the question of 
overrepresentation. To statistically test the hypotheses, a linear OLS regressions test was used to analyze 
to what extent the proportion of a party’s messages (H1) or visibility (H2) in the news could be explained 
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by the proportion of populist communication in its press releases, thereby illustrating the overall effects of 
party populism on media access apart from country-specific appearances. 
 
Results 
 
The Coverage of Populist Party Messages 
 
As shown in Figure 1, around a quarter (25.3%) of Austrian press releases contained one or 
more populist statements. This figure was slightly lower for German press releases, which only showed 
populist communication in 17.6% of the cases. In contrast, populist communication could be identified in 
more than half of the press releases published in France (50.3%) and Greece (54.4%). In the Greek 
Efimerida, 24.4% of all depicted party messages were populist, whereas this was slightly lower in I 
Kathimerini (17.5%) and in the coverage of the French Le Figaro (17.9%). Le Monde (10.8%), the SZ 
(8.9%), and Der Standard (6.2%) showed considerably fewer populist messages, whereas in the German 
FAZ, just 2.6%—and in the Austrian Die Presse, none—of the depicted party messages were populist. 
Thus, the percentage of populist messages in the news was highest in those countries where there was 
also relatively more populism in party communication, namely France and Greece. 
 
To clarify the question of disproportionate media attention for party populism, the percentage of 
a party’s populist press releases and that of its populist messages in the news were set in relation to each 
other. A proportional or even overproportionate representation of populist party statements was not found 
in any of the studied newspapers. Rather, populist claims were underrepresented in news coverage 
compared with what the parties sent out. However, regarding the journalistic selection process, there 
were differences between and within the countries. In Germany, for example, the ratio between populist 
press releases and populist messages shown in the FAZ was roughly 1:7, whereas a much more 
“permeable” ratio of 1:2 was found for SZ news coverage. In addition, not only was there a rather high 
proportion of populist statements reflected in the French Le Figaro and the Greek press, but these 
newspapers also seemed to filter party populism less strictly than, for example, the Austrian press or the 
German FAZ. 
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Figure 1. Populist party communication in press releases and news coverage. 
 
To test whether populist party messages were covered in the news more frequently than nonpopulist 
messages, the ratio of populist press releases to populist party statements in the news was analyzed using a 
scatterplot (Figure 2). If the ratio of populist to nonpopulist party messages was the same in a party’s press 
releases and in news coverage, the corresponding data points would lie on a straight line with a slope of one 
(shown dashed in the graph). If, however, the share of populist messages was greater than that of populist 
press releases, the populist messages were more likely than nonpopulist messages to reach the news. 
Corresponding data points in the scatterplot then would lie above the line that indicated a 1:1 ratio of 
representation. However, this only applied to the data points of the German CDU/CSU and the Greek OP, which 
is why H1 could not be confirmed: All other parties were sending out more populism than what was shown in 
the news. A regression line of all the actually observed values (solid line) compared with the hypothetical one-
to-one ratio shows a much flatter slope and is equivalent to the coefficient of a linear OLS regression; F(1, 23) 
= 0.506; p < .001. That this value is smaller than 1 also shows that populist messages were less often 
portrayed in reporting than nonpopulist party messages, meaning that the latter were filtered out of coverage 
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by the media. However, the positive and highly significant predictor also indicates that more populist party 
communication did lead to more populist party statements that were visible in news coverage. 
 
 
Figure 2. Scatterplot: Party populism and representation of populist messages in the news. 
 
Media Visibility of Populist Parties 
 
A party-specific frequency distribution allowed for further examination regarding whether populist 
parties were overrepresented in the news in relation to their electoral strength. To draw a conclusion about 
proportionality, it was relevant how media presence was distributed between a country’s national parties, 
independent of other actors’ presence in the news. Thus, the percentage values for media presence (actual 
visibility) were standardized (i.e., the sum of percentages for the relevant parties equaled 1, while the ratio 
of visibility between the parties remained the same). In the case of the vote shares, a certain share of 
national election results usually fell on other tiny parties. Because it was only relevant how electoral strength 
was distributed among the parties selected here (proportional visibility), those values were standardized so 
that they referred exclusively to the selected parties. Then, party-specific deviations from a proportional 
visibility were determined and compared with a party’s respective share of populist communication. 
Figure 3 shows that the visibility distribution in the Austrian and German news appears to have 
been relatively independent of party-specific populist communication. The right-wing parties FPÖ (Austria) 
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and AfD (Germany), who sent out the highest proportion of populist communication, did not receive more 
visibility than one would expect from their political relevance. On the other hand, the similarly populist right-
wing party BZÖ in Austria and the somewhat less populist German Greens on the left were slightly 
overrepresented. The conservative CDU/CSU enjoyed overproportional visibility too, even though its press 
releases had the lowest percentage of populism of all the parties. 
 
 
Figure 3. Percentage of populist party communication and deviation from proportional visibility 
in the news. 
 
 
 
All in all, both the extent of populist party communication and the deviation from a proportionally 
distributed party presence in the quality media were higher in France and Greece than in Austria and 
Germany. The two then-governing center parties, the French PS and the Greek ND, both released a 
significantly lower proportion of populist communication than the other parties and were strikingly 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020) Party Populism and Media Access  2373 
underrepresented in the news.6 The right-wing conservative and strongly populist UMP in France was also 
clearly underrepresented, but apart from the two major catch-all parties, all other French parties were 
overrepresented in the news. However, in France, it was the center-right MoDem and the right-wing FN that 
received the most overproportional visibility, whereas in Greece, the parties to the left of the political 
center—especially the highly populist socialist electoral alliance SYRIZA—were more or less overrepresented. 
In contrast, regardless of their highly pronounced populism, the extreme-right “Golden Dawn” (XA) was 
clearly underrepresented, and the two right-wing LAOS and ANEL parties were portrayed proportionally to 
underproportionally in Greek news coverage. 
 
An added variable plot illustrates the relationship between visibility and party populism, adjusted 
for the influence of a party’s vote share—that is, its political relevance (see Figure 4). A regression analysis 
revealed a positive and significant effect of populist party communication on a party’s visibility in the news, 
F(2, 24) = 0.0681; p < .001.7 The more populist communication a party sends out, the more often it tends 
to appear in the news. This finding supports H2, according to which the media are more likely to report on 
political parties when they use populist communication. 
 
 
6 The reason behind this could lie in the coding logic; compared with Austrian and German articles, a rather 
large number of the governing parties’ statements in French and Greek news articles were explicitly referred 
to as government statements, so they did not fall into the general analysis of the national political actors’ 
messages. 
7 The robustness of the visibility model was checked by additionally calculating a model that controlled for 
government participation because this too was an indicator of political relevance. Furthermore, the analysis 
dealt with a small sample size, and single cases may have had a large influence on the regression estimates. 
Thus, two additional models were calculated (with/without government participation) that excluded all cases 
exceeding the conventional Cook’s D threshold (4/n) to identify potential outliers. In essence, these 
additional results did not change from the original ones. All alternative models are provided in the Appendix 
(Table A5). 
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Figure 4. AV plot: Party populism and visibility in the news. 
 
Discussion 
 
The article sheds light on the specific news value inherent in populist communication and through 
an input-output analysis examined whether populist communication offers an intrinsic advantage over 
nonpopulist communication in the news selection process. 
 
Before the findings are discussed in more detail, it is important to address the study’s limitations. 
First, the operationalization of populist communication for quantitative content analysis has continuously 
evolved into more fined-grained measurements (e.g., Ernst, Engesser, Bu ̈chel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017; 
Schmuck & Hameleers, 2019) since this study was conducted. However, with respect to the core content to 
be captured, the majority of more recent operationalizations did not significantly differ from Jagers and 
Walgrave’s (2007) version, which in turn was distinguished by its simplicity and applicability. Nevertheless, 
the use of more detailed operationalizations may be an enrichment for subsequent studies. Furthermore, 
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the study’s focus was on the quality press, and only two newspapers were analyzed per country. Hence, the 
findings’ generalizability is limited because they do not necessarily apply to other media in a particular 
country. In addition, all findings relate to the context of the EP elections. If effects can already be found in 
connection with European issues, comparable results in the context of national debates are likely because 
these dominate the political and media agenda. Nevertheless, further research should clarify to what extent 
the results can be applied to the coverage of national or global political affairs. Moreover, the statistical 
models are based on a small sample size because the assumptions were examined at the level of individual 
parties. This problem was addressed by using regression diagnostic methods to check whether the models 
were robust after excluding influential cases. To support the findings, however, further studies should 
involve more parties and, accordingly, more research countries. An extension of the country sample could 
provide further information on the observed country differences. With regard to the latter point, it is also 
worth noting that the liberal media system was not represented in this study; the inclusion of Great Britain, 
with its highly commercialized press, for example, could further consolidate the generalizability of the 
confirmed H2 across different country contexts. 
 
In general, the analysis shows that a party’s use of populist communication is not necessarily a 
successful strategy for disproportionate media attention: Across all countries and newspapers, much less 
party populism was visible in the news than political actors originally sent out. Apart from just becoming 
populism amplifiers, the mass media may apparently play roles that are less or not at all in the interest 
of populist parties. It may not be particularly disadvantageous for parties if the media adopt a rather 
indifferent role as mirrors of party populism and proportionally reflect it in news coverage—although these 
parties can no longer hope for an amplifying media effect to reach voters. It can, however, be detrimental 
for parties if their populist messages are underproportionally or not at all conveyed by the news and if 
the media appear as (self-appointed) populism correctives—the role that, in fact, must be ascribed to all 
the media under study. 
 
In any case, the question is how this finding fits into the theoretical framework. One possible 
explanation would be that journalists ignore the news value of populist communication and intentionally do 
not convey populist messages because they do not want to become populists’ mouthpieces. 
 
It is furthermore conceivable that the media intentionally omit people references while solely 
reflecting the elite critique—now without the populist antagonism—as part of the party statement. Being a 
forum for discourse, the media’s correction of party populism into a mere establishment critique is both 
normal and desirable within the framework of a democratic system. However, whether anti-elitist elements 
were depicted in the article without their associated reference to the people cannot be determined 
retrospectively because of the specific coding logic and must be clarified in future studies. 
 
Although there is no overproportional transmission into coverage, an increase in populist party 
communication undoubtedly increases the amount of populist party messages in the news. Hence, party 
populism is not completely filtered out of the news, and populist parties are well able to pass their message 
to voters via the mass media. A third explanation is that a populist statement is considered relevant in the 
selection process, but—because of, for example, specific journalistic working techniques or space 
restrictions—is not conveyed to the media in its entirety. Therefore, populist statements would no longer be 
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identified as such, and the effect of populist party messages in reporting would be underestimated in the 
results. Populist communication would then be transmitted to coverage in a “fragmented” form (see 
Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017). However, it is questionable whether one can still speak of populism 
in its proper sense, for it is precisely one of this study’s strengths that the antagonistic character of populism 
is incorporated into its definition by being a necessary condition for identifying populist statements. 
 
In any case, this initial finding should not fundamentally call into question the close connection 
between news value and political populism. The statistical analysis has shown that more populist statements 
significantly increase a party’s media presence, indicating that populist press releases do attract attention 
in the process of journalistic selection; this is why the media—while not conveying the (entire) populist 
statement—are more likely to report on the responsible actors. 
 
A general overrepresentation of political actors because of their populist communication cannot be 
confirmed with the available data. Instead, in this context too, media roles emerge that are not 
advantageous for populist parties: Populist actors may gain just as much visibility in news coverage as is 
legitimate in relation to their political relevance. The media then merely act as neutral rapporteurs because 
they do provide populist parties access to the media, but they distribute visibility independent of a party’s 
populist communication. Beyond that, it is possible for some media to deliberately act as opposing 
rapporteurs and to grant populist parties little or no visibility in the news, even though their political 
relevance would legitimize more media presence. 
 
The German and Austrian quality media are closest to the role of neutral rapporteurs, given the 
parties’ overall small deviation from proportional visibility, which seems to be relatively unaffected by 
populist communication. Greek newspapers seem to face right-wing populist parties as neutral or even 
opposing rapporteurs (especially in the case of the XA), while overall, they predominantly tend to act as 
secret helpers of left-wing populist parties. Finally, the French press—although the UMP is an exception in 
this respect—can be considered the populists’ secret helpers, with the political center and right-wing parties 
benefiting more from this role than the French left. 
 
These results indicate that the journalists’ handling of populist party communication may not be 
based solely on the professional orientation toward news value, but also on political preferences. Additional 
research should clarify which other factors—such as a newspaper’s editorial line or the extent of political 
parallelism within different media systems—affect a party’s access to the media when it uses populist 
communication. Future studies could furthermore provide information on the extent to which specific issues 
addressed in populist press releases find their way into political news. The question is, then, whether these 
issues are (potentially) more frequently covered in the news because of their very own news value, or 
because they were communicated through populist communication. Finally, there is need for clarification 
regarding the question of the extent to which the adopted media roles can be traced back to deliberate 
decisions of media professionals. 
 
The media’s corrective or opposing roles are desirable insofar as these roles do not provide a 
platform for populist parties and messages. From a normative perspective, after all, it may be the task of 
the mass media not only to criticize social grievances, but also to actively counter any possible dangers for 
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liberal democracy. By filtering out populist messages, the media may help to ensure that the political 
discourse is not permeated by an illiberal tenor. However, even if the press does not completely censor 
party populism, but merely decelerates its dissemination, it risks giving a larger target to the accusation of 
the “lying press”; this accusation has been emanating from the populists for quite some time. Media 
professionals who intentionally opt for a corrective function must be aware that their efforts may even give 
a boost to populist actors. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Number of Coded Press Releases per Party. 
 
# Press 
Releases 
% of PR 
Containing 
Populism  
# Press 
Releases 
% of PR 
Containing 
Populism 
Austria 934 24.8 France 179 50.3 
Grüne 107 19.6 FdG 69 31.9 
SPÖ 361 24.7 Verts 8 50.0 
ÖVP 217 9.7 PS 16 12.5 
NEOS 20 30.0 MoDem 11 72.7 
BZÖ 93 37.6 UMP 7 57.1 
FPÖ 136 44.1 FN 68 73.5 
Germany 301 16.9 Greece 518 54.2 
Die Linke 60 23.3 KKE 85 87.1 
Grüne 56 26.8 SYRIZA 144 63.6 
SPD 78 9.0 OP 33 30.3 
CDU/CSU 53 17.9 DIMAR 36 41.7 
FDP 28 1.9 PASOK 64 29.7 
AfD 26 34.6 ND 45 13.3 
   LAOS 37 62.2 
   ANEL 61 57.4 
   XA 13 53.8 
Total    1931 33.8 
Note. Italicized elements indicate the total number of coded press releases and populist content for the 
respective countries or for all countries combined.   
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Table A2. Number of Coded Articles and Active Actors in News Coverage. 
 # News Articles 
# Active Actors 
Nat. Parties Total 
Austria 304 109 533 
Die Presse 165 61 302 
Der Standard 139 48 231 
Germany 327 84 681 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 144 39 298 
Süddeutsche Zeitung 183 45 383 
France 327 169 764 
Le Figaro 161 95 365 
Le Monde 166 74 399 
Greece 391 158 574 
I Kathimerini 196 80 299 
Efimerida ton Syntakton 195 78 275 
Total 1349 520 2552 
Note. Italicized elements indicate the total number of coded news articles and active actors for the 
respective countries or for all countries combined.   
 
Table A3. Coding Examples. 
Variable Example (Source) 
People Reference  
Explicit mention of and 
advocacy for a specific 
population group 
We simply cannot go on like this if we are to even begin the task of restoring the 
living standards and community cohesion available to millions of hardworking 
British families (Nigel Farage of UKIP, 22 May 2014). 
Explicit mention of a specific 
population group and 
allegedly expressing this 
group’s attitude 
Voters are sick and tired of the same old business-as-usual politics and they 
are voting Green because they know that a Green vote is a vote for real 
change for the common good. They are realizing we are the party offering 
the most just and sustainable future for the whole of Britain and the planet 
(Natalie Bennett of The Greens, 24 May 2014). 
Elite Critique  
Criticism toward political 
elites in terms of accusation 
and negative evaluation of 
government performance 
David Cameron has broken his solemn promise to the British people on one 
of the most important political issues. And he has done so because he 
refuses to take back control of our borders in respect of more than 400 
million people from more than two dozen countries on continental Europe 
(Nigel Farage of UKIP, 22 May 2014). 
Criticism toward political 
elites in terms of 
discreditation and 
accusation 
After years of being ignored by the out-of-touch political elite, after years 
of watching our Green and Pleasant Land turned into a bankrupt, crime-
ridden, Third World slum—it’s time to hit back and tell the greedy, useless 
politicians exactly how you feel! (Press Release of the BNP, 22 May 2014).  
Note. All examples are taken from UK press releases that were employed during the coder training. 
Table A4. Number of Coded Messages in News Coverage per Active Actor. 
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# Coded 
Messages 
% of Messages 
Containing 
Populism  
# Coded 
Messages 
% of Messages 
Containing 
Populism. 
Austria 109 1.8 France 169 14.2 
Grüne 12 0.0 FdG 8 12.5 
SPÖ 25 4.0 Verts 15 6.7 
ÖVP 25 0.0 PS 42 7.1 
NEOS 9 0.0 MoDem 14 14.3 
BZÖ 11 9.1 UMP 64 12.5 
FPÖ 27 0.0 FN 26 34.6 
Germany 84 4.8 Greece 158 20.9 
Die Linke 3 0.0 KKE 18 66.7 
Grüne 10 20.0 SYRIZA 66 19.7 
SPD 18 0.0 OP 3 33.3 
CDU/CSU 45 4.4 DIMAR 13 15.4 
FDP 2 0.0 PASOK 28 7.1 
AfD 6 0.0 ND 21 0.0 
   LAOS 0 n.a. 
   ANEL 9 33.3 
   XA 0 n.a. 
Total    520 12.1 
Note. Italicized elements indicate the total number of coded messages and populist content for the 
respective countries or for all countries combined.   
 
Table A5. OLS-Regressions: Party Populism and a Party’s Visibility in the Quality Press. 
 
Party Visibility 
Model 1 Model 2a Model 3b Model 4a, b 
PartPop 0.0681*** 0.0686** 0.0482** 0.0490** 
 (0.0180) (0.0211) (0.0162) (0.0171) 
vote share 0.288*** 0.287*** 0.256*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0388) (0.0274) (0.0358) 
government  0.0612  −0.299 
  (1.312)  (1.220) 
_cons −1.882 −1.902 −0.909 −1.105 
 (1.006) (1.110) (0.889) (0.889) 
N 27 27 26 25 
adj. R2 0.768 0.758 0.782 0.805 
Note. Non-standardized OLS coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. All regressions have high 
tolerance values (> 0.30) and low values for VIF (< 3.5), indicating that there are no severe 
multicollinearity effects present. 
aOLS regression controlled for government participation. bOLS regression after identification of influential 
data points (Cook's D > 4/n: Model 3 without SYRIZA; Model 4 without SYRIZA & PASOK).  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .00. 
